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Abstract. An adversary who aims to steal a black-box model repeatedly
queries the model via a prediction API to learn a function that approx-
imates its decision boundary. Adversarial approximation is non-trivial
because of the enormous combinations of model architectures, parame-
ters, and features to explore. In this context, the adversary resorts to
a best-effort strategy that yields the closest approximation. This paper
explores best-effort adversarial approximation of a black-box malware
classifier in the most challenging setting, where the adversary’s knowl-
edge is limited to a prediction label for a given input. Beginning with
a limited input set for the black-box classifier, we leverage feature rep-
resentation mapping and cross-domain transferability to approximate a
black-box malware classifier by locally training a substitute. Our ap-
proach approximates the target model with different feature types for the
target and the substitute model while also using non-overlapping data for
training the target, training the substitute, and the comparison of the
two. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against two black-
box classifiers trained on Windows Portable Executables (PEs). Against
a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) trained on raw byte sequences of
PEs, our approach achieves a 92% accurate substitute (trained on pixel
representations of PEs), and nearly 90% prediction agreement between
the target and the substitute model. Against a 97.8% accurate gradient
boosted decision tree trained on static PE features, our 91% accurate
substitute agrees with the black-box on 90% of predictions, suggesting
the strength of our purely black-box approximation.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in machine learning (ML), specially in deep learning, have led to
significant improvement on the accuracy of image classification, machine trans-
lation, speech processing, and malware/intrusion detection. Despite their im-
pressive accuracy, deep neural networks (DNNs) and other traditional machine
learning models such as Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines, and De-
cision Trees have been shown to be vulnerable to training-time poisoning [8,9],
test-time evasion [7,33,14,25], model extraction [34,28,24], and membership in-
ference attacks [31,11].
With the advent of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS), ML models are increasingly
served via prediction APIs to allow remote submission of input samples to pro-
duce predictions or provide pre-trained models as foundations to build up on.
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While MLaaS enables new frontiers of ML use-cases such as serving models from
the cloud with pay-per-query price model, it also exposes models behind predic-
tion APIs to model extraction/approximation attacks via iterative input-output
interactions [34,31,19,28,24]. An adversary aiming to game a prediction API of a
model to avoid a pay-per-prediction bill or a competitor targeting the trade secret
of a model have financial motivations to steal ML models. For instance, adver-
saries are motivated to steal (approximate) a remote black-box model trained on
privacy-sensitive data (e.g., medical records), intellectual property (e.g., stock
market trends), or inherently security-sensitive data (e.g., malware/intrusion
traces). In general, so long as the cost of approximating an ML model is lower
than the potential financial gain from obtaining a close-enough copy of it, MLaaS
will continue to be a target of financially motivated adversaries.
More precisely, given a black-box model fb (e.g., a malware detector) served
via a prediction API, the adversary’s goal is to perform best-effort approximation
of fb’s decision boundary by locally training a substitute model fs. Best-effort
in this sense refers to relying on limited seed-set (e.g., 5%-10% of the training
set for fb) to probe fb and leveraging publicly accessible resources (e.g., features,
pre-trained models) for effective and efficient approximation of fb.
Previous work explored black-box model approximation by leveraging the
fidelity (e.g., probability scores) of predictions [34,19], feature and/or model
architecture similarity between fb and fs [16,34,25,28], and cross-model trans-
ferability [25,26]. The approximation formulation spans equation solving [34],
optimization methods [18], generative adversarial networks [16], and reinforce-
ment learning [24].
This paper explores adversarial approximation of a black-box malware detec-
tor fb in the most challenging setting for the adversary. In particular, we explore
a threat model where the adversary aims for a close-enough approximation of fb
in the face of (i) access to limited inputs to fb, (ii) for a given input sample no
additional observations beyond prediction label, (iii) different feature represen-
tations for fb and fs, and (iv) disjoint training sets for fb, fs, and the similarity
evaluation set. To that end, beginning with limited seed-set for the black-box
classifier, we leverage representation mapping and cross-domain transferability
to approximate a black-box malware classifier by locally training a substitute.
Our work complements prior work [16,34,25,19,28,26] in three ways. First, we
do not assume any adversarial knowledge other than prediction label for a given
PE. This is a strong adversarial setting, which effectively leaves the adversary
no leverage except a best-effort strategy that relies on publicly available vantage
points (e.g., input samples, pre-trained models). Second, we approximate fb with
different feature types for fb (e.g., byte sequences) and fs (e.g., pixel intensities).
By mapping the representation of PEs from byte-space to pixel-space, our ap-
proach eliminates the need for manual feature engineering. The motivation be-
hind using dissimilar feature representations for fb and fs is to leverage publicly
accessible pre-trained models (e.g., Inception V3 [1]) by means of transfer learn-
ing, while only training on the last layer. While prior work [25] demonstrated
cross-model transferability for image classifiers, we show a different dimension
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of transferability in a cross-domain setting by re-purposing a pre-trained im-
age classifier to approximate a black-box malware detection model trained on
raw-byte sequences of PEs. Third, we deliberately use non-overlapping data for
training fb, training fs, and comparison of similarity between the two. We note
that some prior work [34,25,26,24,19] use disjoint data when fb is hosted by
MLaaS providers. It is, however, hard to verify the disjointedness of fb’s train-
ing data against fs’s or the comparison set, because in such a setting fb’s training
data is typically confidential.
Against a black-box CNN [27] trained on byte sequence features of Windows
PEs, our approximation approach obtained up to 92% accurate CNN on pixel
features, and trained based on the Inception V3 [1] pre-trained model (details
in 4.3). On a comparison dataset disjoint with the black-box’s and the substi-
tute’s training sets, our approach achieved nearly 90% similarity between the
black-box CNN and the substitute one. In a nutshell, the results suggest that,
even if the target model is a black-box, an adversary may take advantage of a
limited training data and the underlying knowledge of pre-trained models (In-
ception V3 in this case) to successfully approximate the decision boundary of
a black-box model. An intriguing observation of our results is that, although
the training samples used for approximation are disjoint with training samples
used to train the black-box CNN, the adversary can still achieve an acceptable
approximation of the black-box CNN with minimal efforts. Another intriguing
observation is, despite the dissimilarity of the representation of the black-box
(i.e., byte sequences) and that of the substitute model (i.e., pixels), our approx-
imation approach still managed to achieve nearly 90% similarity between the
target black-box and the substitute model.
We further evaluate our approach on a research benchmark dataset, EM-
BER [6], which is based on static PE features (details in 4.4). Our approach
approximated the LightGBM [20] black-box model supplied with EMBER via a
91% accurate substitute model, which agrees with the black-box on 90% of test
PEs. With EMBER, we also explore how our approximation strategy performs
on different models by training multiple substitute models, confirming the valid-
ity of our approach across model architectures such as Decision Trees, Random
Forests, and K-Nearest Neighbours. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
– By mapping byte sequence features to pixel representations, we eliminate
the need for heuristics-based feature engineering, which significantly reduces
adversarial effort towards feature guessing.
– Leveraging a pre-trained model as a foundation, we extend the scope of
transferability from a cross-model setting by demonstrating the utility of
cross-domain transferability for black-box approximation.
– We demonstrate the feasibility of close-enough adversarial approximation
using different feature representations for the black-box and the substitute
model, across multiple model architectures, and complementary datasets.
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2 Background and Threat Model
2.1 Model Approximation Attacks
In this work, we focus on supervised learning for malware classification models,
where input samples are Windows PEs and the output is the class label, i.e.,
benign or malware.
Let X be a d-dimensional feature space and Y be the c-dimensional output
space, with underlying probability distribution Pr(X,Y ), where X and Y are
random variables for the feature vectors and the classes of data, respectively.
The objective of training an ML model is to learn a parameter vector θ, which
represents a mapping fθ : X → Y . fθ outputs a c-dimensional vector with each
dimension representing the probability of input belonging to the corresponding
class. l(fθ(x), y) is a loss of fθ on (x, y), and it measures how “mistaken” the
prediction fθ(x) is with respect to the true label y. Given a set of training
samples Dtrain ⊂ (X,Y ), the objective of an ML model, fθ, is to minimize
the expected loss over all (x, y) : LDtrain(fθ) =
∑
(x,y)∈Dtrain l(fθ(x), y). In ML
models such as DNNs, the loss minimization problem is typically solved using
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) by iteratively updating the weights θ as:
θ ← θ −  · ∆θ(
∑
(x,y)∈Dtrain l(fθ(x), y)), where ∆θ is the gradient of the loss
with respect to the weights θ; Dtrain ⊂ (X,Y ) is a randomly selected set (mini-
batch) of training examples drawn from X; and  is the learning rate which
controls the magnitude of change on θ.
Figure 1 depicts a typical setup for model approximation attacks against a
MLaaS platform that serves a black-box model fb via a prediction API. The goal
of the adversarial client is to learn a close-enough approximation of fb using as
few queries (x′i’s) as possible.
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Fig. 1. Typical pipeline for model approximation attacks. MLaaS provider trains a
model fb on confidential/proprietary data X. It then serves fb via a prediction API to
allow clients to issue queries and obtain prediction results. An adversarial client uses
fb as an oracle to label |X ′| samples to train fs such that fs ≈ fb.
Typically, model approximation is used to steal a deployed model (e.g., intel-
lectual property, security-sensitive business logic) [34,18,28], trick/bypass pay-
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per-prediction walls, perform reconnaissance for later attacks that go after the
integrity of the victim model through adversarial examples [25], or mount mem-
bership inference attacks for models known to be trained on privacy-sensitive
data [31,11].
The success of approximation depends on the adversarial client’s knowledge
(about details of fb and its training set) and capabilities (e.g., access to inputs,
maximum number of queries). In a white-box (full knowledge) setting, the adver-
sary has complete knowledge of the target model architecture and its training
data, making it the easiest for the adversary (but the most exposing for the
target model). In a grey-box (partial knowledge) setting, the adversary has some
knowledge about fb’s model architecture (e.g., DNN vs. SVM) and training data
(e.g., a subset of the training set), which makes it moderately challenging. In
a black-box (no/limited knowledge) setting, the adversary knows nothing but
prediction labels (and possibly confidence probabilities) for a given input. This
is the most challenging setting for the adversary. In this paper, we consider the
black-box setting. Next, we describe our threat model.
2.2 Threat Model and Problem Statement
We consider the strongest threat model compared with previous work on adver-
sarial approximation [34,28,25]. The adversary interacts with a deployed model
fb, for instance served from MLaaS malware detector. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the ML model fb is a malware detector.
Adversary’s Goals: The adversary’s goal is to approximate the decision
boundary of fb by training its substitute fs, beginning with a limited seed-set
of PEs.
Adversary’s Knowledge: The adversary only knows that fb accepts Win-
dows PEs as input and returns labels (“benign” or “malicious”) as output. The
adversary doesn’t know fb’s architecture, parameters, hyper-parameters, or fea-
tures. Besides, the adversary has no access to the training data or the test data
used to train and evaluate fb.
Adversary’s Capabilities: The adversary probes fb with PEs to obtain
prediction labels. We assume there is an upper bound on the number of queries
the adversary can issue to fb, but the adversary can workaround the query limit
by probing fb over an extended time-window or from different IP addresses. The
adversary has access to a limited seed-set of PEs, but is unable to tell whether
or not the PEs in the seed-set overlap with fb’s training set. The adversary is
able to continuously collect more PEs to use fb as an oracle and progressively
train fs with the goal of obtaining a close-enough approximation of fb.
Problem Statement: Given a deployed malware detection model, fb, un-
der the threat model stated earlier, the adversary’s goal is to find fb’s closest
approximation, fs, with best effort. By “best effort” we mean relying on limited
seed-set to probe fb, and leveraging publicly accessible resources (e.g., feature
representations, pre-trained models) towards effective and efficient approxima-
tion of fb.
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More formally, given a black-box model fb trained on dataset X, for a seed-
set |X ′| < |X| and X ′ ∩ X = ∅, the adversary’s goal is to train fs using X ′
such that when compared on dataset X ′′ disjoint with X and X ′, fb ≈ fs. The
≈ quantifies the percentage of agreement (i.e., number of matching predictions
between fb and fs X
′′). The closer the agreement is to a 100% the more ac-
curate the approximation and vice-versa. The real-life implication of successful
approximation of fb via fs is that once the adversary obtains a close-enough
(e.g., > 90%) substitute of fb, the intellectual property of fb’s owner (e.g., an
IDS vendor) is jeopardized. Even worse, the adversary might as well emerge as
fb’s competitor by tuning fs’s accuracy with additional training data.
3 Approach
Overview: Figure 2 depicts an overview of our approach. Given a black-box
malware detector fb, the adversary collects benign and malware PEs from pub-
lic sources to obtain the substitute training set (X ′). The adversary then uses fb
as an oracle to label samples in X ′ (Section 3.1). Next, samples in X ′ are mapped
from a source representation: raw-bytes to a target representation: pixel inten-
sities (Section. 3.2). The progressive approximation step uses the mapped X ′
to iteratively approximate fb (Section 3.3). It combines representation mapping
and cross-domain transferability to obtain a close-enough approximation of fb
with a limited seed-set to fb (i.e., |X ′| < |X|), different feature representations
for fb and fs, and disjoint training sets for fb, fs, and the comparison set used to
evaluate similarity between fb and fs (i.e., X∩X ′∩X ′′ = ∅). The approximation
begins by training an initial substitute model fs on a fraction (e.g., 20%-25%) of
X ′, and fs is refined until it achieves acceptable accuracy. Using a dataset X ′′,
the last stage of the approach compares similarity between fb and fs (Section
3.4). A higher similarity score for fb and fs is an indication of the effectiveness
of the approach at approximating the decision boundary of fb.
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Fig. 2. Approach overview. fb is accessible by the adversary via a prediction API only.
For the sake of presenting an end-to-end approximation framework, Figure 2
includes fb’s training at the beginning. In practice, the adversary doesn’t have
access to the black-box model except through its prediction API. It is also note-
worthy that the three datasets (X, X ′, and X ′′) shown in Figure 2 are disjoint.
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Again, in reality, with no access to fb’s training set, the adversary has no triv-
ial way to determine if the substitute training set (X ′) or the model similarity
comparison set (X ′′) have intersection among themselves or with the black-box
training set (X). The only motivation of training our own black-box model fb is
to ensure X, X ′, and X ′′ are disjoint, and doing so lets us to deterministically
examine the most challenging adversarial setting described earlier.
3.1 Approximation Set Labeling
Given a seed-set of Windows PEs collected by the adversary, a first-cut labeling
strategy would be to take the ground truth labels that the samples come with
(e.g., using VirusTotal [4] as an oracle). Had our goal been to train a malware de-
tector, such an approach would suffice. Our goal, however, is to approximate the
decision boundary of a black-box malware detector, and we expect our labeling
method to serve this purpose.
Given a set of approximation samples X ′ = x′1, ..., x
′
m and a learned hypothe-
sis function fb, we obtain fb(x
′
i) = y
′
i. The y
′
i’s may or may not match the ground
truth labels. If fb misclassifies some x
′
i’s, the misclassified x
′
i’s will not match the
ground truth counter-parts. What should be done with the misclassified sam-
ples in the substitute training set? The alternatives we have are (a) drop the
misclassified x′i’s and explore approximation with the correctly labeled x
′
i’s, (b)
reinstate labels to ground truth labels and proceed with approximation, or (c)
take the labels assigned by fb for what they are. Alternative (a) is no different
from training the substitute without querying fb. Alternative (b) entails “cor-
recting” the “imperfections” of fb (note “correcting” could as well mean lower
accuracy because we are essentially changing the underlying distribution of fb’s
training set). Alternative (c) is the most realistic for our threat model, because
it takes fb for what it is and uses its predictions (y
′
i’s) to populate the labeled
approximation set, which is highly likely to result in a realistic approximation
of fb’s decision boundary.
3.2 Representation Mapping
Under our threat model, the adversary doesn’t know what features are used to
train fb. The adversary may then pursue different possibilities of features used to
train malware detectors based on Windows PEs. However, the space of possible
features is exponentially large. For example, if we only consider static analy-
sis based features of a given PE, we end up with numerous possible features
such as meta-data, DLL imports/exports, byte sequences, and so on. Similarly,
considering the dynamic analysis-based features of PEs results in several can-
didates such as API/system call traces, instruction sequences, and call graphs.
Therefore, given enough resources, while such a strategy of feature guessing may
result in a close-enough approximation, it may not be the preferred avenue by
the adversary whose goal is to effectively and efficiently approximate fb.
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In-line with the adversary’s goals, we map the raw bytes representation of
each PE to an image representation (pixel values), analogous to taking a photo-
graph of the PE’s raw byte sequences. The main rationale is, instead of searching
for the best combination of a set of features to train the substitute, it is plausible
to capture the whole PE’s bytes via image representations such that the learn-
ing algorithm is able to “discover” distinguishing sub-structures from the image
representation of PEs. We note that previous work ([23,15,21]) has also explored
bytes-to-pixels conversion for malware detection, although not in the exact con-
text of model approximation via cross-domain transferability that we explore
in this work. Another equally important rationale for bytes-to-pixels mapping
is the accessibility (to the adversary) of acceptably accurate pre-trained image
classification models such as Inception V3 [1] which, by way of transfer learning
[25], feed knowledge to the substitute model.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. (a) and (b) show EN and CH rendering, respectively, of a benign PE
(small02Micro Card Reader Driver 3.11.exe). (c) and (d) show EN and CH rendering,
respectively, of a malware PE (Trojan.GenericKDZ.58985).
To realize the bytes-to-pixels mapping, the key intuition is to transform PEs
into a colored canvas, such that the colors (pixel intensities) represent the bytes
in the PEs, and the color intensities are used as features to train the substitute.
To this end, we leverage two types of image representations, the Entropy (EN)
representation [30] and the Color Hilbert (CH) representation [13]. CH scans the
bytes of a PE and assigns color based on the value of each byte. The assigned
pixel intensities are then mapped on a canvas of a chosen dimension. EN uses
Shannon Entropy [30] to compute the randomness of bytes in a specific location
of the executable as E = −∑ni=1 ρi log2 ρi, where ρi refers to the probability of
appearances of a byte value i and n is the number of possible values (n = 256 for
possible byte values). Depending on the computed value of E, the correspond-
ing pixel is assigned color intensity in the range black (minimum/zero entropy)
to bright pink (maximum entropy). An example that illustrates EN and CH
representation for a benign PE is shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively.
Similarly, Figure 3 (c) and (d) show EN and CH representations of a malware
PE, respectively. Notice the clear visual difference between benign and malware
PEs, which seems to support our intuition of mapping bytes to pixels. Looking
at the CH representation, the combination of these colors in the images serves
Best-Effort Adversarial Approximation of Black-Box Malware Classifiers 9
best to give the model discriminating features to put apart benign and malware
PEs. With regards to the EN representation, we can see that the focus is more
on areas instead of specific pixels, and it is not as high-fidelity as the CH rep-
resentation. In section 4, we evaluate the utility of EN and CH representations
via the substitute’s accuracy. Next, we briefly describe how the canvas is filled
with colors.
To paint the canvas of the image, we leverage a well-known mapping tech-
nique called the Hilbert curve [10] (implemented in BinVis [13]), which makes
sure that if two bytes are close to each other in the PE, they should be close
to each other in the image representation of the PE as well. This property of
the Hilbert curve is essential to preserve the semantic structure of PEs when
mapping bytes to pixels, and it provides the substitute model an accurate repre-
sentation of the PE so that, during training, it explores the classification utility
of all possible features. A natural question would be, how does the Hilbert curve
function? Intuitively, the idea of Hilbert curve is to find a line to fill a canvas
that will keep the points which are close to each other on that line at the same
distance when it fills the needed space. This, in our case, keeps the features of
the PEs intact since separating them would lead to breaking the semantics of
the sequence of bytes that represents a part of our feature set in the images we
would like to generate at the end of the mapping.
Note that although representation mapping is core to our approach, some-
times, feature guessing may fit the best-effort strategy when the adversary has
access to publicly released datasets such as EMBER [6], which reveal details
about features. To account for this possibility, in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we evalu-
ate our approach with minimal relaxation on our threat model, i.e., the adversary
knows features because of public disclosure as in [6]. As we will show, the purely
black-box approximation is as strong as the minimally relaxed approximation.
3.3 Progressive Approximation
On the one hand, the adversary has access to limited input samples to the black-
box model. On the other hand, the adversary has access to pre-trained and pub-
licly accessible image classification models (e.g., Inception V3 [1]). To obtain an
acceptably accurate approximation of the black-box model, the adversary takes
advantage of the advances in image classification models to quickly and accu-
rately train a candidate substitute on the mapped features of the PEs via cross-
domain transferability. The motivation behind leveraging pre-trained models is
threefold. First, the fact that our substitute model relies on image classification
for which state-of-the-art benchmark datasets are readily accessible. Second, the
prospect of using a widely available and acceptably accurate pre-trained model
for anyone (including the adversary) is in favor of the constraints the adver-
sary has on collecting enough training samples for the approximation and come
up with an effective model architecture tuned to adversarial goals. Third, when
using pre-trained models, we are only retraining the last layer, which not only
saves us (the adversary) time, but also gives us confidence on the accuracy of
the final model because of transferability. Moreover, taking advantage of image
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representations cuts the effort on feature engineering down to zero because the
candidate substitute (e.g., a CNN) would automatically learn the features from
its mapped training data, i.e., image representations of PEs.
Fig. 4. Progressive approximation of fb.
In order to emulate an adversary who begins with a limited seed-set to boot-
strap approximation, we assume that the adversary has batch1 as the first batch
(e.g., 20%) of substitute training samples X ′. The adversary first trains fs on
batch1 and evaluates its accuracy against a pre-determined threshold, which
could be set close-enough to fb’s accuracy for our case. In real-life, one can safely
assume that the adversary would estimate the accuracy threshold from public
knowledge (e.g, state of the art model accuracy for malware classifiers). Simi-
larly, the adversary can set a similarity threshold based on prediction matches
between fb and fs over dataset X
′′. The adversary would then actively collect
training data, and progressively re-train and re-evaluate fs each time they ob-
tain the next batch of approximation examples, until an acceptable accuracy and
similarity score is obtained, or the training data is exhausted. Figure 4 shows
the details of the progressive approximation.
We note that previous work, specially on image classification models, re-
lies on data augmentation [25,26] techniques to address data scarcity for train-
ing a substitute. Augmentation aims to synthesize minimally manipulated, yet
semantically intact variants of samples (e.g., images). Although augmentation
techniques such as flipping and rotation would yield more synthetic samples for
training a substitute, in contrast to image classifiers, minor flipping or rotation
may result in broken semantics in PEs. To demonstrate the utility of augmen-
tation, we explored how to extend our approximation dataset by three-fold via
minor flipping, rotation, and flipping followed by rotation (details in Appendix
A).
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3.4 Similarity Comparison
Once the substitute model fs is trained with an acceptable accuracy, its effective-
ness is assessed when compared with the black-box model on a separate dataset,
disjoint with both the training set of the black-box and the substitute. Figure 5
shows the procedure for similarity comparison of fb and fs.
Fig. 5. Similarity comparison between fb and fs.
The similarity score is the percentage of matching predictions between fb
and fs. The higher the similarity score, the closer fs is to fb, which means fs
effectively mirrors the decision boundary of fb. The adversary then probes fs for
further attacks in a white-box setting. Attacks that succeed on fs, would, by tran-
sitivity, succeed on fb. This is the essence of having an accurate approximation
which would be used as a substitute for the black-box. By crafting adversarial
examples using methods such as FGSM [33] and CW [12], the adversary can
transitively target fb using fs as a surrogate white-box model. Comparison of
our candidate substitutes with the black-box model is discussed in Section 4.4.
4 Evaluation
We now describe our datasets, experimental setup, and results on progressive
approximation and similarity comparison.
4.1 Datasets
Table 1 summarizes our datasets: Custom-MalConv and EMBER[6].
Custom-MalConv: We collected benign PEs from a Windows freeware site
[2] and malware PEs from VirusShare [3]. These two sources are used by prior
work [27,6,5,16,29] on adversarial examples and malware detection. Overall, we
collect 67.81K PEs with 44% benign and 56% malware. We use 60% for train-
ing the black-box CNN, 23% as substitute training set, and 17% as similarity
12 Abdullah Ali and Birhanu Eshete
Dataset Benign Malware Total
Custom-MalConv
Black-Box training set 20, 000 20, 000 40, 000
Substitute training set 8, 000 8, 000 16, 000
Similarity comparison set 2, 045 9, 765 11, 810
Total 67, 810
EMBER[6]
Black-Box training set 400, 000 400, 000 800, 000
Substitute training set 75, 000 75, 000 150, 000
Similarity comparison set 25, 000 25, 000 50, 000
Total 1, 000, 000
Table 1. Datasets for Custom-MalConv and EMBER.
comparison set. Since we control the dataset, we use this dataset to evaluate
the effectiveness of our approach on representation mapping and cross-domain
transferability.
EMBER: EMBER [6] is a public dataset of malware and benign PEs re-
leased together with a Light gradient boosted decision tree model (LGBM) [20]
with 97.3% detection accuracy. The dataset consists of 2351 features extracted
from 1M PEs via static binary analysis. The training set contains 800K labeled
samples with 50% split between benign and malicious PEs, while the test set con-
sists of 200K samples, again with the same label split. The authors of EMBER
used VirusTotal [4] as a labeling oracle to label samples in EMBER. We use this
dataset to further evaluate the generalizability of our approach. We note, how-
ever, that EMBER releases only static analysis based features extracted from
PEs, not the PEs themselves, which limits our scope of doing representation
mapping. Despite the absence of original PEs, we still evaluate our approach
on a different feature space and over multiple candidate substitute models. Of
the 200K test set samples, we use 150K as substitution training set, and the
remaining 50K (25%) as similarity comparison set.
4.2 Experimental Setup
Black-box Models: The Custom-MalConv black-box is trained on 20K benign
and 20K malware PEs. It is based on MalConv [27], a widely used malware de-
tection CNN in adversarial ML literature on malware [22,32]. We use the same
architecture as the original MalConv [27] with slight modifications to fit our
hardware (NVIDIA 1080 with 8GB of RAM). MalConv is based on raw bytes
of a PE and reads the first 1MB to extract byte features. To fit our hardware
limitations, we fed only 13MB of each PE to our custom CNN, and got an accu-
racy of 93% which is acceptable since MalConv [27] used 100K PEs to achieve
98% accuracy. The LightGBM black-box is trained on 400K benign and 400K
malware PEs and is shipped with the EMBER [6] dataset with 97.3% accuracy.
Substitute Models: For Custom-MalConv black-box model, our fs is based
on Inception V3 (IV3) [1] and is trained on both CH and EN representations
of the substitute training set. In addition, for sanity check, we trained a substi-
tute Custom-MalConv model with exact same features and model parameters
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Fig. 6. Custom-MalConv: IV3 progressive
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Fig. 7. Custom-MalConv: IV3 progressive
accuracy with EN.
as our black-box. For EMBER, we explore 4 candidates for substitute model,
namely: decision trees (DT), random forests (RF), k-Nearest neighbors (kNN),
and gradient-boosted decision tree model (LGBM).
Progressive Approximation: For Custom-MalConv, we use 16K substi-
tute training set and train fs progressively on 4K, 8K, 12K, and 16K PEs. For
LGBM, we use 150K of the 200K test set with a progression of 30K, 60K, 90K,
120K, and 150K PEs. The metrics we use are validation accuracy and similarity
score. Validation accuracy is the prediction accuracy of the approximated sub-
stitute. Similarity score (as shown in Figure 5) is the percentage of matching
predictions between fb and fs.
4.3 Progressive Approximation Results
Custom-MalConv: Figure 6 shows the training accuracy and validation accu-
racy of each progressive step in training fs: IV3 with CH representation. It can
be seen that the difference between training and validation accuracy narrows
as the model progresses with more training data, which is an indication of the
real-life effectiveness of the model on training examples it has never seen dur-
ing training. Similarly, Figure 7 shows the progressive training of fs: IV3 with
EN representation. Here, the trend persists, where we see a very high training
accuracy across the board, but as we train on bigger data sets we get a more
accurate model (validation accuracy is close to training accuracy).
For both CH and EN representations, it takes only 10% the size of fb’s train-
ing set to approximate it with fs that achieves 0.9 and 0.95 validation accuracy,
respectively. On IV3 with CH, quadrupling the substitute training set (4K to
16K) improved its validation accuracy by 0.1 only, showing the feasibility of
approximation under data scarcity by taking advantage of transferability. IV3
with EN shows a slightly different progress. On 16K approximation samples, it
achieves 0.92 validation accuracy, which is 3% less than the IV3 with CH trained
on 4K samples. Looking at the difference between the training and validation
accuracies (green vs. orange bars in Figures 6 and 7), we notice that the nar-
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rower the gap between training and validation accuracy, the more stable a model
would be classifying unknown samples.
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Fig. 8. Progressive accuracy of fs: LGBM.
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Fig. 9. Progressive accuracy of fs: DT.
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Fig. 10. Progressive accuracy of fs: RF.
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Fig. 11. Progressive accuracy of fs: kNN.
EMBER: Figure 13 shows the progressive validation accuracy of the four
candidate substitute models against the LGBM black-box. Compared to the
progress of Custom-MalConv substitutes (Figures 6 and 7), the validation ac-
curacies of LGBM, DT, and RF are relatively lower (in the range 0.85 - 0.88).
However, kNN stands out as a clear contender (validation accuracy = 0.91) when
compared with Custom-MalConv substitutes. Again, interestingly, the LGBM
substitute, despite its architectural similarity to the target black-box LGBM, is
not the best in terms of accuracy. From Figures 8 - 11, it is noteworthy that the
gap between training and validation accuracy for EMBER substitutes is compar-
atively bigger (on average 4%) compared to the narrow differences (on average
0.5%) for Custom-MalConv substitutes shown in Figures 6 and 7.
Looking at the substitute training set size with respect to the LGBM black-
box, to obtain the best performing substitute (kNN), it takes only 18.8% (150K)
of LGBM’s training set size (800K). Interestingly, from Figure 8, we notice that
the LGBM substitute, despite its architectural similarity with the target LGBM,
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Fig. 12. Custom-MalConv: Benign vs. malware prediction agreement split for fb and
fs.
performs relatively poorly, suggesting that model architecture similarity may not
always result in the best approximation.
4.4 Similarity Comparison Results
Custom-MalConv: As shown in Table 2, we have 3 substitutes, a Custom-
MalConv substitute, InceptionV3 with CH, and InceptionV3 with EN. The com-
parison of these substitutes with the black-box is done on a separate comparison
set, disjoint with the black-box training set and the substitute training set.
Substitute (fs) Validation Accuracy Similarity (fb, fs)
InceptionV3-ColorHilbert 0.91 82.19%
InceptionV3-Entropy 0.92 88.65%
Custom-MalConv-ByteSequence 0.90 80.11%
Table 2. Custom-MalConv: Similarity comparison between fb and fs.
On average, our approach achieved 83.7% similarity score, with the highest
similarity score of 89%, on IV3 substitute trained on EN representation. The
MalConv substitute that matches the architecture of the black-box Custom-
MalConv model is the least accurate, which interestingly indicates that model
architecture similarity may not always result in a substitute that agrees well with
a black-box target. When we compare CH-based and EN-based substitutes, EN-
based substitute outperforms the CH-based substitute by about 6.5%, which
could be attributed to the canvas coloring schemes of CH and EN.
Figure 12 shows the details of similarity scores for the three substitute models
split into malware and benign. To compute the split, for each label, we divide
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Substitute (fs) Validation Accuracy Similarity (fb, fs)
Decision Tree 0.85 86.3%
Random Forest 0.87 87.7%
k-Nearest Neighbors 0.91 89.9%
LightGBM 0.88 97.1%
Table 3. EMBER: Similarity comparison between fb and fs.
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Fig. 13. EMBER: progressive validation
accuracy of candidates for fs.
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Fig. 14. EMBER: progressive similarity of
fb with fs.
the number of agreements between fb and fs by the total number of samples for
that label. Having a malware detection rate higher than the benign detection
rate serves us best, since our goal is to be able to identify malware identified as
so by the black-box. It can be seen that the EN-based substitute tends to agree
with the black-box more on malware, while the CH-based substitute agrees with
the black-box more on the benign predictions. Again, this variation is rooted in
the canvas coloring methods of the two representations discussed earlier.
EMBER: Table 3 summarizes the similarity comparison between LGBM
black-box and candidate substitute models. On average a substitute model agrees
with the black-box on 90.3% of the comparison samples. kNN, as the closest
approximation with a different model architecture from the black-box, agrees
with it on almost 90% of the comparison samples. This result is comparable to the
best substitute in Custom-MalConv: InceptionV3-Entropy with 89% similarity
score. We also notice from Table 3 that, although it is the least accurate model
from Figure 13, LGBM substitute agrees with the LGBM black-box on over
97% of the comparison instances. This is not surprising, given the exactness
of the model architectures. It is, however, in contrast to our observation on the
similarity of Custom-MalConv-ByteSequence substitute with the same black-box
model architecture, which scores just over 80% similarity (see Table 2).
Figure 14 shows the evolution of similarity scores showing how kNN substi-
tute’s similarity improves almost by 10% in the range 90K - 150K of approxi-
mation instances. RF substitute also shows a similar pattern, but with a smaller
improvement of 4% (83% to 87%). Note that the LGBM substitute remained
stable across the progressive increment of the substitute training set.
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Fig. 16. EMBER: Malware prediction
match between fb and fs.
Finally, Figures 15 and 16 show the progression of benign and malware sim-
ilarity matches as we train the substitutes. It can be seen that, overall, there
is high degree of agreement between the LGBM black-box and the substitutes
on benign predictions. On benign predictions, the LGBM substitute shows a
stable and close to 100% agreement with its black-box counterpart. On malware
predictions, it shows variations in the range 83% - 95%.
5 Related Work
We review closely related work in image classification and malware detection,
and make approach-level comparisons in Table 4.
Tramer et al. [34] show equation-solving and optimization based attacks that
approximate target ML models with near-perfect replication for popular learning
algorithms including logistic regression, support vector machines, neural net-
works, and decision trees. They demonstrate their attacks against production
MLaaS providers such as BigML and Amazon ML. They note that their most
successful model approximations are for MLaaS services that return prediction
labels with probability scores.
Papernot et al. [26] demonstrate an adversary controlling a remotely hosted
DNN with no knowledge about the DNN and its training data. They train a local
substitute against a target DNN using synthetically generated inputs labeled by
the target DNN. They then use the local substitute to craft adversarial examples
to evade DNNs hosted by MetaMind, and also train logistic regression substitutes
against Amazon and Google prediction APIs.
Papernot et al. [25] train substitute models to approximate a target black-box
model, and craft adversarial examples to evade it. They use the Jacobian-based
dataset augmentation method to synthetically generate examples for training the
substitute. Similar to [26], they demonstrate transferability within and between
different classes of ML models such as DNNs, logistic regression, support vector
machines, decision trees, nearest neighbors, and ensembles.
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Hu and Tan [16] train a substitute model using the GAN framework to fit
a black-box malware detector. In a follow-up work [17], they use the GAN-
based substitute model training for a recurrent neural network. Both approaches
([16,17]) assume the adversary knows the type of features and the architecture
of the black-box model. In our case, we assume that the adversary knows noth-
ing about the details of the black-box. In addition, our approach differs from
[16] in the assumption about the underlying feature representations of training
examples (Windows PEs).
While [16] assumes the same (API calls precisely) feature representation of
the black-box and the substitute, in our work, the black-box and the substitute
have different feature representations. Rosenberg et al. [29] adopt the Jacobian-
based augmentation [25] to synthesize training examples to approximate and
evade a target black-box malware detector based on API call features. Like
Papernot et al. [25] and Hu and Tan [16], Papernot et al. in a different work [26]
craft adversarial examples to evade a black-box model.
Orekondy et al. [24] follow a similar threat model to ours where publicly
available images from a domain different from the black-box model are used to
train a substitute ‘Knockoff’ model. They show selecting samples from a totally
different distribution using reinforcement learning is effective for an approxima-
tion attack, while using different model architectures for the victim black-box
and the substitute knockoff. We note that, in the cross-domain transferability
setting, this work is the closest to ours except that it uses the same pixel features
for both fb and fs, while we use byte sequences for fb and pixels for fs.
Next, we make approach-level comparisons of our work and closely related
prior work. Table 4 shows multi-criteria comparison of this work with the state-
of-the-art in image classification and malware detection. Since direct quantitative
comparison is non-trivial given differences in assumptions and dataset/task het-
erogeneity, our comparison is rather qualitative and is based on assumptions
about feature representation, model architecture, initial substitute training set
size, training dataset overlap between black-box and substitute model, and black-
box prediction output.
Features (fb, fs) compares assumptions about features of the black-box
(fb) and the substitute (fs). While prior work [25,16,28,17,26,29,19] assumed
similar features for fb and fs, we consider raw-bytes for fb and pixels for fs.
Model (fb, fs) captures assumptions about similarity of model architectures
for fb and fs. Unlike most prior work [16,17,25,26,19,28] which assume the same
model architecture for fb and fs, we assume the adversary is free to evaluate
different model architectures for fs (hence could match fb’s architecture or end
up using a different one).
Seed-set (fs) compares assumptions on the size (number of training exam-
ples) of the seed-set to train fs. In [25,26,28], the adversary explores synthetic
data generation techniques such as augmentation to generate more training sam-
ples to train fs. In [16] and [17], the adversary collects enough samples to train
fs. In this work, we explore approximation with access to a limited seed-set that
we extend with data augmentation techniques.
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[26,19] [34] [29] [28] [16,17] [24] [25] This work
Features(fb, fs) same same same same same same same different
Model(fb, fs) same same/different different same same different different different
Seed-set(fs) moderate moderate moderate limited moderate moderate limited limited
Data(fb, fs) disjoint disjoint N/A N/A disjoint disjoint disjoint disjoint
Output (fb) label+conf. label+conf. label label label label label label
Table 4. Approach-level qualitative comparison with closely related work.
Data (fb, fs) examines whether or not there is overlap in training sets used
for fb, fs, and comparison of fb with fs. In this work, we use disjoint datasets
for training fb, fs, and comparison of fb with fs. Doing so enables assessment
of the effectiveness of fs approximated with a completely new dataset.
Output (fb) captures whether label only or label with confidence score
(conf.) is returned from fb. While prior work used label only [16,29,28,17,24]
and label with probability score [26,34,19], our black-box returns only the label
of the PEs, i.e., “benign” or “malware”.
6 Conclusion
We presented a best-effort adversarial approximation approach that leverages
representation mapping and cross-domain transferability to obtain a close-enough
approximation of a black-box malware detector. We show that an adversary can
obtain nearly 90% similarity between a black-box model and its approximation
beginning with a limited input-set to the black-box, different features and dis-
joint training sets for the black-box and its substitute. We further demonstrate
that our approach generalizes to multiple model architectures across different
feature representations. This work broadens the scope of adversarial approxi-
mation of a black-box ML model in a strictly black-box setting. Our results
shade light on the fact that different feature representations may not necessarily
hinder close-enough approximation and disjoint datasets still result in successful
approximation. More importantly, a pre-trained multi-class image classifier, such
as Inception V3, can be re-purposed to approximate a binary malware classifier,
demonstrating the scope of transferability beyond cross-model and extending it
to a cross-domain setting.
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Appendix A
Augmentation on Image Representation of PEs: Training a substitute
based on a pre-trained model depends on the availability of enough training
examples, but the adversary may not have the leverage to collect enough training
data. This challenge is specially true when one attempts to collect benign PEs
from the wild. We observe that, while it is relatively easy to obtain a dataset
of hundreds of thousands of malware PEs from malware repositories, it takes
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weeks to collect benign executables due to the lack of publicly curated benign
PEs. To address the scarcity of training examples, in other domains such as
image classification, the adversary exploits the notion of data augmentation,
which aims to synthesize minimally manipulated yet semantically intact variants
of an image representation of the PEs [25,26]. Intuitively, augmentation involves
slightly altering an image while keeping the main features of the image intact.
In vision tasks (e.g., image classification), augmentation methods (e.g., slight
rotation, flipping) shouldn’t visually alter the object. In our approach, however,
augmentation needs to keep PE semantics (e.g., malicious payload) intact. While
slightly altering a PE’s image, we don’t want to end up with a mutated image
that semantically diverges from the original bytes representation of a PE.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(a) (b) (c)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 17. Augmentation of a benign PE (02Micro Card Reader Driver 3.11.exe). (a):
original EN, (b): flipped CH, (c): rotated EN.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(a) (b) (c)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 18. Augmentation of a malware PE (Trojan.GenericKDZ.58985). (a): original CH,
(b): flipped EN, (c): rotated CH.
To explore the potential of augmentation, we carefully choose the augmenta-
tion methods for our approximation strategy. In particular, we selected flipping
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and rotation to synthesize variants of the training examples. These two augmen-
tation methods are proved to keep the original structure of an image intact [26].
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate flipping and rotation of a benign and malware sam-
ple, respectively. Through augmentation, we managed to increase our substitute
training set by three-fold. The impact, on the substitute’s accuracy, of extending
the initial substitute training set through augmentation is shown in Figure 19.
Augmentation-Based Approximation: The goal here is emulating an
adversary with scarce training data and aims to expand to more training data
with less time. We begin with the 8K executables for each label (16K overall)
and apply (a) rotation (by 90 degrees), (b) flipping, and (c) rotation + flipping
to obtain twice as much (32K) for rotation and flipping each, and three times
(48K) by merging the samples synthesized by rotation and flipping with the
original 16K samples we started with. In Figure 19, the left-half shows substi-
tute accuracy for CH and the right-half shows the same, but for EN. The CH
results are not much different from the results from Figure 6 and 7. This doesn’t
mean that the augmentation strategy is not useful, but it gives us visibility into
the effectiveness of the specific representation and augmentation we used. For
EN results, however, we see a slightly different trend. In particular, we notice
a small improvement when using the flipped images with our original set. This
could be attributed to the different features in the EN representation that the
model is trained on. However, we see a very minor drop in accuracy (91.8% →
91.4%) when we add the rotated images. The accuracy of augmentation methods
is overall comparable to the progressive training presented earlier. More impor-
tantly, so long at PE semantics is preserved, the augmentation methods can be
done fast to address the data scarcity challenge for the adversary.
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Fig. 19. Custom-MalConv: accuracy of fs for Color Hilbert (CH) and Entropy (EN)
representation with image flipping (F) augmentation and rotation (R) augmentation.
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Similarity Comparison with Augmentation: The last 4 rows in Table 5
show substitutes trained with augmented data for both EN and CH represen-
tations. Comparing the different augmentation methods, it depends on whether
we use CH or EN. The EN-based representations consistently outperformed the
CH-based representations for all the augmentation techniques. As discussed ear-
lier, this difference is attributable to the different canvas coloring methods used
in CH and EN.
Approximation Method Similarity (fb, fs)
Custom-MalConv-ByteSequence 80.11
InceptionV3-ColorHilbert 82.19
InceptionV3-Entropy 88.65
InceptionV3-ColorHilbert(32K) Flipped 81.69
InceptionV3-Entropy(32K) Flipped 88.15
InceptionV3-ColorHilbert (48K) Flipped and Rotated 80.76
InceptionV3-Entropy (48K) Flipped and Rotated 88.88
Table 5. Custom-MalConv: similarity comparison including the augmentation-based
substitutes.
